HeldWed 28 Oct 2026,
Strategic Cooperation and Incentive Design in Competitive and Dynamic Environments
Competing businesses and mobile users, and the incentives that persuade them to cooperate instead of working purely for themselves.
Recording not yet available
The defense
From the Maastricht University agenda
- When
- Wed 28 Oct 2026, 90 min
- Where
- Maastricht University, Netherlands
- Fields
- Supervisors
- Co-supervisor
- Language
- English
- Recording
- Recording not yet available
About the thesis
The thesis studies strategic decisions where personal incentives can clash with collective efficiency. It asks how cooperation forms and lasts amid competition, limited information and changing participation.
The first part uses a Bertrand collusion model to study coalition formation and how firm number affects stable coalitions, prices and profits. It shows collusion can persist in equilibrium as firms increase.
The second part examines cooperation in Mobile Crowdsensing through alliances and incentives amid heterogeneous requesters and participants, incomplete information and changing participation. It develops incentives aligning individual goals with system objectives and uses game-theoretic models to analyze participation and task completion.
Together they link individual incentives to collective outcomes, clarifying when cooperation can persist despite conflicting incentives.
Read the thesisUniversity announcement
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Listed from the Maastricht University agenda.